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HEN courts, yielding to business necessity, relaxed the
early common law rule that whatever is annexed to the
soil belongs to the soil, and permitted tenants to remove those
fixtures which they had erected for purposes of trade or agriculture, there was opened up a possibility for confusion as to
the character of such fixtures during the period of annexation.' The fact that such fixtures after annexation were removable by the tenant, made possible the extension of the
installment-buying title-reserved sales business to chattels
which were to be affixed to the realty, since the conditional
vendor relied on the right of removal as his security. But
inevitably, conflicts arose between mortgagees of the realty
and such conditional vendors as to whether the removal
should be permitted. This article proposes to deal only with
the comparative rights of conditional vendors and prior
mortgagees in such a situation.
It is the rule at common law that a realty mortgage, even
without an express clause to that effect, covers not only the
land as it was at the time the instrument became a mortgage,
but also any improvements or additions subsequently made
thereto which became realty as a matter of law. 2 Thus the
mortgagee of vacant land is entitled to a house subsequently
built on that land as part of his security, without any express
provision to that effect in the mortgage. And if the house
'See Note (1907) 20 HARv. L. Rav. 565.
Raht v. Attrill, 106 N. Y. 423, 13 N. E. 282 (1887) ; Gates v. De La Mare,
142 N. Y. 307, 37 N. E. 121 (1894).

2
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was already on the land at the time the mortgage sprang into
existence, the realty mortgage covers any permanent additions thereto without express clause so stating, if their nature
or method of annexation is such that they became realty as
a matter of law, notwithstanding the intention of the mortgagor and conditional vendor to the contrary shown by the
3
express reservation of title in the conditional sale contract.
It is only in reference to conditionally sold chattels, which
after annexation to the realty do not become realty as a matter of law, that the unpaid conditional vendor may have the
right of the removal as against a prior realty mortgagee. As
to such chattels three different views were entertained at
common law.
According to the Massachusetts doctrine all chattels affixed to realty went to a prior real estate mortgagee, conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage, notwithstanding,4
for the reasons, first, that the conditional vendor, although
ignorant of the mortgage, nevertheless had consented to make
his property part of the soil, and so must be content to abide
the consequences 8 and secondly, that the reservation of title
in the conditional vendor is invalid, since all fixtures are
covered by the mortgage and the mortgage contract cannot
be changed by an agreement to which the mortgagee is not a
party.6 At the other extreme was the New York doctrine
that a chattel mortgagee 7 or a subsequent conditional
vendor 8 took precedence, without filing, against a prior
mortgagee of the real estate, because when a chattel was annexed after the execution of the realty mortgage, the mortgagee was not misled into thinking that the fixture was part
of his purchase and no injustice resulted if it were not included in the mortgage. The third view, known as the New
Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
'Tippett & Ward v. Barham, 180 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910) ; Clary v.
Owen, 15 Gray 522 (Mass. 1860) ; Meagher v. Hayes, 152 Mass. 228, 25 N. E.
105 (1890); Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, 110 Wis. 80, 85 N. W. 698 (1901).
'Note (1894) 8 HARv. L. REv. 55; (1896) 10 HARv. L. REv. 190; (1919)
32 HARv. L. REv. 732.
'FRYeR, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1938)" 1027; (1927) 11
MINN. L. REv. 667.
' Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859).
8Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873); Kerby v. Clapp, 15 App. Div. 37,

44 N. Y. Supp. 116 (2d Dept. 1897) ; Goddard v. Gould, 14 Barb. 662 (N. Y.
1853).

1938 ] VENDORS AND PRIOR REALTY MORTGAGEES

3

Jersey rule, steered a middle course between the other two
views, avoiding the extreme position of either. According
to this view, which was also sometimes known as the Vermont
rule, the intention manifested by the conditional sale agreement to preserve the character of the chattel as personalty
after annexation to the realty, prevails against the prior
mortgagee of the realty, so that the chattel may be removed
by the conditional vendor, unless its severance 'would so injure the freehold as substantially to diminish its value as
security." The theory back of this third view is that as the
mortgage is merely security, the prior mortgagee has advanced nothing in reliance on the value of the subsequently
annexed chattels, and he should not be permitted to acquire
them, as a part of his security, contrary to the intention of
the party making the annexation and to the injury of the
unpaid conditional vendor. 10 The prior mortgagee has parted
with nothing on the strength of a belief that the articles
would be annexed and will lose none of his original rights if
they are removed, whereas the conditional seller depends on
them for his security." This third view that where a removal of the fixtures will not materially injure the mortgagee's original security, the conditional vendor may assert
his right as against the prior mortgagee of the realty, was the
majority rule at common law in the United States 12 and
even an after acquired property clause in the mortgage was
held not to invalidate the agreement between the conditional
seller of the chattel and the mortgagor-purchaser.' 3
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 7, covering
the subject of "Fixtures" provides:
' Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712,
34 Sup. Ct. 753 (1914); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 5 Colo. 569,
179 Pac. 154 (1919); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. George, 77 Minn.
319, 79 N. W. 1028 (1889); Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244 (1888);
Blanchard v. Eureka Planing Mill Co., 58 Ore. 37, 113 Pac. 55 (1911); Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 (1870).
"See note 6, supra; (1919) 32 HARV. L. Rev. 732.
FRYER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1029; (1901) 15 HAv. L. REv. 236;
(1935) 19 MINN. L. Rev. 342.
'New Chester Water Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 53 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 3d,
1892); Raymond v. Ball, 210 Fed. 217 (S. D. Ill. 1913); Title Bond & Guaranty Co. v. Pointer, 243 Mich. 415, 220 N. W. 786 (1928); FRYER, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 1033; (1933) 9 Wis. L. REv. 198.
=Bromish v. Burkholder, 98 Kan. 261, 158 Pac. 63 (1916); Cox v. New
Bern Lighting and Fuel Co., 151 N. C. 62, 65 S. E. 648 (1909).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

"If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a
conditional sale or subsequently as to become a part
thereof and not to be severable wholly or in any portion without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so severable
shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against
any person who has not expressly assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to realty at the
time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become part thereof but to be severable without material
injury to the freehold, the reservation of property
shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against
subsequent purchasers of the realty for value and
without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless
the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly
describing the realty [and containing the name of the
owner thereof (added by the New York Legislature in
enacting Section 67 of the New York Personal Property Law) ] and stating that the goods are or are to be
affixed thereto, shall be filed before such purchase in
the office where a deed of the realty would be recorded
or registered to affect such realty. As against the
owner of realty [who is not the buyer of the goods
(added by the New York Legislature in enacting Section 67 of the New York Personal Property Law)]
the reservation of the property in goods by a conditional seller shall be void when such goods are to be
so affixed to the realty as to become part thereof but
to be severable without material injury to the freehold, unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy
thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller
briefly describing the realty [and containing the name
of the owner thereof (added by the New York Legislature in enacting Section 67 of the New York Personal Property Law)] and stating. that the goods are
to be affixed thereto shall be filed before they are affixed, in the office where a deed would be recorded or
registered to affect such realty."
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This section has been enacted by the New York Legislature in Section 67 of the Personal Property Law exactly as
it appears in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act with the
exceptions of the provisions contained within the brackets
in the above quotation.
It is proposed to treat the subject in the following three
situations: I. The rights of a prior realty mortgagee against
the unpaid conditional vendor who has not filed, to chattels
the conditional sale contract of which is required to be filed
under Section 67 of the New York Personal Property Law,
i.e., chattels which do not as a matter of law remain personalty after annexation, but the status of which thereafter
depends upon the intention of the parties as shown in the
conditional sale contract; II. The rights of a prior realty
mortgagee with a personal property clause against the unpaid
conditional vendor who has not filed, to chattels which remain personalty as a matter of law after annexation, where
the prior realty mortgagee had advanced all the mortgage
money prior to the execution of the conditional sale contract;
and III. Where he advances some of the mortgage money
after the execution of the conditional sale contract and after
the installation of the fixtures.
I.
The first sentence of the section purports to govern the
rights of the parties where the affixed chattels are not severable from the realty without material injury to the freehold
and declares that the reservation of title is void "as against
any person who has not expressly assented to the reservation," i.e.; void as against purchasers or mortgagees of
the realty. Thus a conditional vendor of such chattels
would have no right of removal as against mortgagees
of the realty. The second sentence governs the rights of
conditional vendors and subsequent mortgagees of the
realty where the chattels are so affixed as to be severable
without material injury to the freehold. In order to come
within the scope of the second sentence of this section,
the nature of the chattels and the manner of their annexation must be such that they would ordinarily be deemed
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part of the realty so as to pass with it under purchase or devise of the realty, were it not for the express reservation of
title in the conditional vendor." In reference to such chattels the statute does not expressly provide for the protection
of a prior realty mortgagee against an unfiled conditional sale
contract. The inference is that the Legislature meant the
common law rule in New York to apply to such a case.'
"In Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 15, 166 N. E.
787, 788 (1929) Kellogg, J., said: "Certain chattels have such a determinate
character as movables that they remain personal property, after their annexation
to real estate, independently of any agreement between the owner of the chattels
and the owner of the realty which so provides. Other chattels, such as the
brick, stone and plaster placed in the walls of a building, notwithstanding an
agreement to the contrary, conclusively become real estate after annexation
thereto. * * *

"Between the two classes of chattels, those which after annexation, due
to the inherent nature of the subject or the mode of annexation, remain personalty, and those which, due to the mode and purposes of annexation, conclusively become real estate, there was, at common law, a large class of movables
which, after attachment, continued to be personal property, or became real
estate, accordingly as the owner of the chattels and the owner of the real
estate might have agreed. * * *

"Self-evidently, the provision quoted from Section 67 of the Personal
Property Law was intended to affect only chattels belonging to the class which
we have denominated third."
The following chattels when affixed to realty have been treated by the
courts as chattels of the third class described by Judge Kellogg and hence within
the provisions of Section 67 of the New York Personal Property Law. A
boiler for steam-heating purposes to install which the hallway flooring of the
building was left unfinished to permit the boiler to be placed on the concrete
bottom of the cellar, Curry v. Geier Constr. Co., 225 App. Div. 498, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 59 (2d Dept. 1929); a machine to furnish electric power and light so
affixed to real estate as to become a part thereof although easily severed therefrom without material injury to itself or to the freehold, Kohler Co., Inc., v.
Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928); a concrete stone fountain and
concrete flower boxes, attached by cement, the fountain to the land, the flower
boxes to the building, and provided with pipes so that water flows therein and
with electric wires, so that it may be lighted, the whole providing ornamentation
for the building, Metropolitan Stone Works v. Probel Holding Corp., 131
Misc. 519, 227 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1928) ; a heating system of which the boiler
mains were suspended by means of collars screwed to the ceiling of the cellar,
and risers mounting from the mains to the radiators on the various floors, and
passing through holes cut in the floors for that purpose, Modern Security Co.
v. Thwaites, 138 Misc. 469, 246 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1930), aff'd, 234 App. Div.
671, 252 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st Dept. 1931); a pipe organ installed in a space
especially made for it in the walls of a building, In re St. Mark's Hospital,
59 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); an ice-making and refrigerating plant
set on concrete foundation with pipes running through the flooring of the
building. Voss v. Melrose Bond & Mortgage Corp., 160 Misc. 30, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 576 (1936); an elevator installed in a building, Breene v. Elkins, 134
Misc. 118, 235 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1929) ; Harvard Financial Corp. v Greenblatt
Constr. Co., 261 N. Y. 169, 184 N. E. 748 (1932) ; theatre chairs affixed directly
to a concrete floor by means of expanding screws, In re Albanese, 44 F. (2d)
602 (N. D. N. Y. 1930).
' In Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. 1000 Island House Co., Inc., 141 Misc. 39,
252 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1931) it was held that the prior mortgagee was not
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Nor can the prior realty mortgagee obtain any comfort
from the Real Property Recording Act, 16 since that Act
states that recording of mortgages shall operate as constructive notice only as to subsequent purchasers or subsequent
mortgagees of the realty, and a conditional vendor of chattels later affixed, is neither a subsequent purchaser nor a
subsequent mortgagee of the realty.
protected by the second sentence of Section 67. In that case a prior realty
mortgagee instituted a foreclosure action making as co-defendants, with the
mortgagor, the conditional vendor of a sprinkler system installed so as to
become a part of the realty but easily and readily removable without material
injury to the freehold, or to the system itself, and a judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, who had issued execution on the premises. It was held that .the
conditional vendor had the right to remove the sprinkler system as against both
the prior realty mortgagee and the judgment creditor. The Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Dowling, said at p. 43: "Nor does the second sentence of
Section 67 of the Personal Property Law avail either the plaintiff or the
defendant Ahlheim Bros., Inc., (the judgment creditor) because, if the case
comes within the provisions of said sentence of the Personal Property Law, the
conditional sales contract, although unfiled, would be good, except as against
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees for value and without notice. The plaintiff is a prior mortgagee and Ahlheim Bros., Inc., a creditor. Neither one,
therefore, falls within the class as to which an unfiled conditional sales contract
is void." See also, Duffus v. Howard Furnace Co., 8 App. Div. 567, 40 N. Y.
Supp. 925 (4th Dept. 1896), in which it was held that a furnace, so placed in the
cellar of a house that it can be removed without substantial injury to the
building, does not pass under a prior mortgage of the house, in case it was
placed therein under a contract providing that it should remain the property of
the seller until paid for.
However, in the following situations a prior realty mortgagee was protected under Section 67: (1) where he purchased at the foreclosure sale for he
is then treated as a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice where
the conditional sale contract was not filed, Voss v. Melrose Bond & Mortgage
Corp., 160 Misc. 30, 288 N. Y. Supp. 576 (1936) ; Realty Associates v. Conrad
Constr. Co., 185 App. Div. 464, 173 N. Y. Supp. 25 (2d Dept. 1918); (2) where
a prior realty mortgagee before making a further advance on the mortgage is
informed by the vendor of chattels annexed to the building that he has not
reserved the title until the same are paid for, the prior mortgagee takes precedence to the extent of such advance over the conditional vendor who had made
the misrepresentation, the elements of an estoppel in pais existing, De Bevoise
v. Maple Ave. Constr. Co., 228 N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920).
" N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 291: "A conveyance of real property, within
the state, on being duly acknowledged by the person executing the same, or
proved as required by this chapter, and such acknowledgment or proof duly
certified when required by this chapter, may be recorded in the office of the
clerk of the county where such real property is situated, and such county clerk
shall, upon the request of any party, on tender of the lawful fees therefor,
record the same in his said office. Every such conveyance not so recorded is
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, from the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real
property or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 290: "The term 'purchaser' includes every person
to whom any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable
consideration. * * * The term 'conveyance' includes every written instrument,
by which any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged * * *."
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At this point attention may be called to the fact that

Section 65 of the New York Personal Property Law, requiring filing of conditional sale contracts as to certain persons,

requires that the contract be filed as against any purchaser
(which includes mortgagee as well), 17 whereas Section 67

states that the contract must be filed as against a subsequent
purchaser (including mortgagee). Hence by familiar rules
of statutory construction it would seem that the Legislature

did not intend to give any protection to prior realty mortgagees against an unpaid conditional vendor of the class of
goods described in Section 67. This conclusion is strengthened by considering the probable effect of the words "before

such purchase (mortgage)" found towards the end of the
second sentence of Section 67 and referring to the time before
which the conditional sale contract must be filed. If those
words mean "before the mortgage is executed and delivered",

then obviously they cannot refer to a prior mortgage, for it
would be impossible for the subsequent conditional vendor

to file his contract before the antecedent mortgage was executed and delivered.

Since the law never requires the doing

of an impossible act, the words "before such mortgage" must
be construed to mean before the instrument had legal inception as a mortgage. When is that? The New York Court of
Appeals has held that an instrument purporting to secure

the repayment of advances made, has no legal inception as
a mortgage until the advances of money have been made by
' Section 65: "Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in
the seller shall be void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who,
without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment
or levy a lien upon them, before the contract or copy thereof shall be filed as
hereinafter provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days
after the making of the conditional sale. This section shall not apply to
conditional sales of goods for resale."
Section 61: "'Purchase' includes m6rtgage and pledge.
"'Purchaser' includes mortgagee and pledgee."
It should be observed that while Section 67 (second sentence) expressly
protects subsequent purchasers for value, Section 65 does not require that the
purchaser shall have paid value. But in explanation of this omission Prof.
George G. Bogert, who drafted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 5
of which is enacted without change in that respect into Section 65 of the New
York Personal Property Law, says in his notes to Section 5: "This element of
value is necessarily implied in the word 'purchaser'. There is no equity in protecting donees of the buyer by the recording section. In view of the great
variety of definitions of 'value', it is deemed wise to leave that question to be
determined by the pre-existing local law and not to attempt to make uniform
the law by a definition in this act."
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the mortgagee1 8 Thus it is seen that in order for the realty
mortgagee to be protected under Section 67, he must have
made an advance of money to the mortgagor before the conditional sale contract is filed.

It is submitted that this conclusion, if sound, opens the
way to protecting a realty mortgagee whose instrument antedates the conditional sale contract, if after the chattels, described in Section 67, have been annexed, he advances some
of the mortgage loan to the mortgagor before the conditional
sale contract is filed. The prior "mortgagee" does not in
legal effect become a mortgagee until the advances are made.
As to advances made after the conditional sale contract is
entered into and after annexation of the chattels, the "prior"
mortgagee is pro tanto a "subsequent" mortgagee and as such,

and to that extent, should be protected under Section 67.
II.

If the nature of the chattels is such that upon annexation to the realty they retain their legal status of personal
' In Kommel v. Herb-Gner Construction Co., 256 N. Y. 333, 337, 176 N. E.
413, 415 (1931), Mr. Justice Kellogg in writing the unanimous opinion of the
Court of Appeals said: "An instrument purporting to secure the repayment of
advances made according to the terms of a certain bond, in the hands of a
mortgagee named, who has neither made advances nor caused them to be made,
is not a legal instrument; it is not a mortgage; nor is its holder a mortgagee."
See also on this point, Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61 (1872) ; Payne v. Burnham, 62 N. Y. 69 (1875); Eastman v. Shaw, 65 N. Y. 522 (1875); Clatlin v.
Boorum, 122 N. Y. 385, 25 N. E. 360 (1890) ; Spicer v. First National Bank,
55 App. Div. 172, 66 N. Y. Supp. 902 (3d Dept. 1901), aff'd without opinion,
170 N. Y. 562, 62 N. E. 1100 (1902) ; Verity v. Sternberger, 62 App. Div. 112,
70 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1st Dept. 1901), aff'd without opinion, 172 N. Y. 633, 65
N. E. 1123 (1901). With reference to the leading case of Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 (1861), in which it was established that the mere
agreement to mortgage personal property subsequently to be acquired gave the
mortgagee a lien upon the property as soon as it was acquired, good against all
but purchasers for value, Williston says: "It is essential that the mortgagee
shall have actually advanced his money. If the contract is wholly executory,
the doctrine of Holroyd v. Marshall is not applicable." Williston, Tranfers
of After-Acquired Personal Property (1906) 19 HARV. L. Ruv. 557, 560.
WAL.SH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 15, at 77, says: "Mortgages given to secure
advances to be made in the future create no lien either at law or in equity until
such advances are made. As money is advanced under a mortgage of this kind
a lien at law arises thereunder to the extent of the advances actually made."
Where a prior mortgagee has made advances to the mortgagor after annexation
of the articles, without knowledge of the conditional character of the sale, it is
recognized that he is entitled to priority over the conditional seller. (1934) 18
Mizx. L. REv. 812, 824.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

property as a matter of law, 19 the rights of the parties are
governed in New York State by Section 65 of the Personal
Property Law, which reads as follows:
"Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller shall be void as to any purchaser
from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of
such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by
attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract or copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within
ten days after the making of the conditional sale. This
section shall not apply to conditional sales of goods
for resale."
Here again according to Section 61 of thd same Act the
word "purchaser" is defined to include mortgagee and the
word "purchase" to include mortgage.
It has been held that conditional sale contracts of this
class of chattels do not need to be filed in accordance with the
requirements of Section 67 20 for they are not affixed to the
realty "as to become part thereof". Hence the provisions of
Section 67 do not apply to the kind of chattels now under dis" Gas ranges attached to the building by coupling to the gas service pipe
have been treated as chattels of the first class mentioned by Judge Kellogg (see
note 1, supra) and not subject to the provisions of Section 67 but to Section 65
of the New York Personal Property Law, Madfes v. Beverly Development
Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929) ; Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp.,
251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929); so also a gas burner set on basement
floor and attached by coupling to gas pipe already extending in front of furnace
and motor attached to electric light socket, Delaware Hill Development Co.,
Inc. v. Delaware Bldg. Corp., 137 Misc. 672, 244 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1930) ; so
also a steel greasing pit installed under earth floor of larger pit of automobile
service station, Marnall-Steel Products, Inc. v. Bernard, 147 Misc. 314, 263
N. Y. Supp. 485 (1933), aft'd, 241 App. Div. 616, 269 N. Y. Supp. 907 (2d
Dept. 1934) ; so also electric light fixtures, New York Title & Mortgage Co.
v. Grossman Properties, 142 Misc. 274, 253 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1931), aff'd, 236
App. Div. 665, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1031, 1033 (1st Dept. 1932) ; so also a pipe
organ installed in a building, Washington Mortgage Corp. v. Forways Realty
Corp., 235 App. Div. 642, 255 N. Y. Supp. 110 (2d Dept. 1932), aff'd without
opinion, 260 N. Y, 595, 184 N. E. 108 (1932) ; so also refrigerators installed in
apartments, Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Byro Realty Corp., 136 Misc. 720, 241
N. Y. Supp. 632 (1930), ay'd, 233 App. Div. 653, 249 N. Y. Supp. 910 (1st
Dept. 1931) ; Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., Inc., 139 Misc. 332, 244 N. Y.
Supp. 455 (1930); so also a silo, Craine Silo Co., Inc. v. Alden State Bank,
218 App. Div. 263, 218 N. Y. Supp. 143 (4th Dept. 1926).
1 Madfes v. Beverly Developing Co., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
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cussion. Instead, since they remain personalty after annexation as a matter of law, the filing requirements of Section 65
21
apply.
Since such chattels never became part of the realty as
a matter of law, the only way in which a realty mortgagee
can'reach them after annexation is by including in the realty
mortgage a clause such as the following:
"Together with all articles of personal property now
or hereafter attached to or used in connection with the
said premises, all of which shall be included in this

mortgage."

22

Obviously, if the realty mortgage contains no such
clause, it cannot cover such chattels after annexation, at least
as against an unpaid conditional sale contract, even though
the latter was never filed, and it makes no difference whether
it was a prior or subsequent mortgage. If there is such a
clause, it has been held that a subsequent realty mortgagee
is entitled to previously conditionally bought and installed
23
chattels in the absence of filing by the conditional vendor.
Assuming there is such a clause, may a prior mortgagee
be entitled to conditionally bought and annexed chattels as
against an unpaid conditional vendor who has not filed? Section 65 states the contract must be filed as against "any purchaser" (mortgagee). Certainly the term "any purchaser"
(mortgagee) is broad enough to include a prior as well as a
subsequent mortgagee. Hence it would seem that the Legislature meant the word "purchaser (mortgagee)" to be without any limitation as to time, and that if the Legislature
meant only a subsequent purchaser (mortgagee) to be protected under Section 65, it would have said so as in Section
67. Since it did not, it may well be argued that it intended
to include a prior as well as a subsequent purchaser (mort'Ibid.
" Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).

But it has been held that this clause does not necessarily bring within the

coverage of the mortgage, movables which are not so attached to the realty as
to become fixtures, such as conditionally sold furniture installed in a hotel,
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz R. Corp., 277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E.

(2d) 70 (1938).
' Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).
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gagee) in the protection afforded in Section 65 by a failure
to file the contract.
However, until this year's amendment of Section 65,24
the conditional vendor was required to file before the purchaser purchased from the conditional vendee. If the words
"any purchaser" were construed to include a prior purchaser
--i.e., one who purchased the article from the conditional
vendee before the conditional sale contract was made, the
section would have been requiring an impossibility in calling for the conditional sale contract to be filed before it is
made. Such a construction would have resulted in manifest
injustice to the conditional vendor. For that reason alone
the words "any purchaser" before the recent amendment,
could not have meant a prior purchaser from the conditional
vendee. The reasonable construction to have placed on Section 65 was that it meant only to protect a purchaser who
had purchased from the conditional vendee after the conditional sale contract was made and before it was filed. Thus,
the practical effect of the section was to protect only a subsequent purchaser from the conditional vendee although it
used the words "any purchaser". But this objection to including a prior purchaser in the protection afforded by a
failure to file under Section 65 seems to have been eliminated
by the recent amendment requiring filing within ten days
after the making of the conditional sale contract, instead of
before the purchaser bought from the conditional vendee, as
theretofore. The objection of requiring an impossibility no
longer stands.
In passing, attention may be called to the fact that the
recent amendment of Section 65 in substance declaring that
as against purchasers (mortgagees) without notice, the reservation of title is void unless filed within ten days after the
making of the conditional sale, in effect provides that the
reservation of title shall be valid without filing for a period
of ten days after the contract of conditional sale contract
is made, even as against purchasers (mortgagees) who have
acquired their interest within the ten-day period in ignorance
2 N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 625, § 2, in effect Sept. 1, 1938.
This amendment
makes Section 65 conform to Section 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
which reads: "Unless such contract or copy is so filed within 10 days after the
making of the conditional sale." See Legis. (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. -.
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of the conditional sale. In his notes to Section 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (from which Section 65 of the
New York Personal Property Law is taken), Professor
Bogert, the draftsman of the Act, says: "Under the statute
the contract is valid for ten days without filing. It was
thought unwise to require the seller to file immediately. The
seller's office may be far distant from the filing district. He
should have a reasonable time to mail his papers and get them

filed." This amendment would seem to operate to deprive a
subsequent realty mortgagee, with personal property clause,
who acquired his interest, even without notice, during the
ten days intervening between the making of the conditional

sale and the filing thereof.

It would also follow that as

against a prior realty mortgagee with after-acquired personal property clause, the conditional vendor does have an
interval of time after the making of the contract and possibly after the annexation of the fixtures in which to protect

his reservation of title by filing the contract.
There have been some cases in the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York 25 in which it has been said
Thus in Perfect Lighting Fixture Co. v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App.
Div. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dept. 1930) there was a prior realty mortgage with a hereafter attached personal property clause. Thereafter the mortgagor purchased some electrical fixtures under a conditional sale contract and
the day they were delivered on the premises, the contract was filed. The mortgagor-conditional vendee defaulted and the vendor brought replevin to recover
the fixtures, making the realty mortgagee a defendant. In deciding in favor
of the conditional vendor, Judge Merrill said at p. 144: "It seems absurd to
claim that a mortgagor of real property could give a mortgage of personal
property not in existence and to which he had no title * * *. Undoubtedly he
could mortgage all to which he at the time had title or which he might subsequently buy and pay for, but we do not think it was within his power to mortgage property not in existence, or which he might at some future date acquire
under a conditional sales contract." See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sanford
Real Estate Corp., 157 Misc. 583, 284 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1935). In Herold v.
Cochrone Boat Co., Inc., 249 App. Div. 318, 292 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dept.
1937) there was a realty mortgage with a hereafter acquired personal property
clause. Thereafter the mortgagor bought some machinery under an outright
purchase and attached it to the premises. - Later on he gave a chattel mortgage
on that machinery to a third person for a loan of money and the third person
duly filed the chattel mortgage. Subsequently, the realty mortgagee brought a
foreclosure action and sought to includie this machinery in the foreclosure. The
chattel mortgagee objected. It was held that the prior realty mortgagee took
precedence. The court pointed out that when the mortgagor bought the machinery under an outright purchase, he (the mortgagor) acquired the title to it,
hence could give a valid lien on it to the prior realty mortgagee; that the
latter's lien attached to the machinery under the personal property clause as
soon as the machinery was annexed to the realty, but that if the machinery
had been purchased under a conditional sale contract, the mortgagor-conditional

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

that it is not in the power of the mortgagor to mortgage
property which he might at some future date acquire under
a conditional sale contract; that a mortgagor cannot give a
valid lien on chattels which he does not own; that if they are
chattels of the second class mentioned by Judge Kellogg in
the Madfes case,2 6 such as gas ranges, he does not own them
even after they have been attached, and so the prior realty
mortgagee with an after-acquired personal property clause
can never have a lien on such fixtures which will be valid as
against an unpaid conditional vendor even if the conditional
sale contract was never filed. These Appellate Division cases
have held that since the conditional vendee-mortgagor does
not have title, the prior realty mortgage cannot attach.
But the very purpose of the filing statute 27 is to protect
innocent third persons purchasing or taking a mortgage from
a conditional vendee who does not have title. For example,
one who purchases the conditionally sold article from the
conditional vendee without notice is protected by Section 65
even though the conditional vendee did not have title, and
under Section 67 a subsequent realty mortgagee is protected
against the unfiled conditional sale contract even though the
conditional vendee-mortgagor had no title to the affixed chattels. In Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp.28 the conditional
vendee-mortgagor had no title to the affixed gas ranges and
yet the Court of Appeals held that the lien of the subsequent
realty mortgagee attached to them under the personal property clause. If the absence of title in the conditional vendeemortgagor is fatal to the prior realty mortgagee's lien, why
should not it also be fatal to the subsequent realty mortgagee's lien? If the subsequent mortgagee's lien attaches
even though the conditional vendee-mortgagor did not have
title, why should not the prior mortgagee's lien attach as soon
as the chattels are affixed even though the conditional vendeemortgagor did not have title? The reason given by the Appelvendee would not have the title to it, and therefore could give no lien on it to
the prior realty mortgagee as against the unpaid conditional vendor, even if the
conditional sale contract had not been filed. See also Wurlitzer v. Cohen, 156
Md. 368, 144 Atl. 641 (1929).
'2 See note 19, supra.
'N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 65.

=251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).
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late Division 21 that the mortgagor cannot give a lien on
chattels he does not own, applies as .well to subsequent mortgagees as to prior mortgagees, and yet in the Cohen case 30
the subsequent mortgagee was held to have a valid lien on
the gas ranges, which were not owned by the conditional vendee. In a subsequent realty mortgage the conditional vendee
is attempting to give a lien on chattels which he does not
own just as much as in a prior realty mortgage. It would,
therefore, seem that the reasoning of these Appellate Division cases is fallacious. However, the conclusion reached by
them that the prior realty mortgagee, even with a hereafter
attached personal property clause, is not entitled to subsequently sold fixtures, where he had advanced all the mortgage money previously to the execution of the conditional
sale contract, even though the latter is not filed, is in accord
with the common law of New York State. Such a mortgagee
has not parted with value (the advances of the mortgage
money) in reliance on the fixtures as part of his security and,
it is submitted, that this, rather than the reason given by the
court in the cases referred to, is the sounder one. A distinction may be made between a prior-and a subsequent mortgagee in that in the case of the subsequent mortgagee, the
chattels have already been affixed and are a visible part of
the security on which the mortgagee relies, whereas in the
case of the prior mortgagee there may never be any afteracquired property and so the reliance of the mortgagee is
purely speculative. Thus, although the conditional vendeemortgagor had no title in either case, the subsequent mortgagee has the fact of reliance in his favor, while the prior
mortgagee has not.

Inasmuch as the instrument does not become a mortgage
until the advances are made, it would appear that if the
prior realty mortgagee makes some of the advances after the
Perfect Lighting Fixture Co. v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App. Div.
141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dept. 1930) ; Herold v. Cochrone Boat Co., Inc.,
249 App. Div. 318, 292 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dept. 1937).
' Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).
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conditional sale contract is made and the chattels affixed, he
is, to that extent, a subsequent mortgagee, and if the realty
mortgage contained a hereafter attached personal property
clause, his lien would be superior to that of the conditional
vendor who had not filed within ten days after the contract
31
was made. In Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.
it appears that after conditionally sold lighting fixtures had
been delivered to an apartment house that was being erected
under a building and loan mortgage, some of the fixtures
were attached to the walls and then building operations
ceased. The rest of the fixtures were left lying on the floors.
Building operations were never resumed. The mortgagor defaulted both on the building loan mortgage and on the conditional sale contract. The building loan mortgagee foreclosed. The Court of Appeals held that the mortgagee was
entitled to those fixtures which were attached as against the
unfiled conditional sale contract, but that the conditional
vendor was entitled to those fixtures which were lying loose
and unattached in the rooms of the building at the time of
the foreclosure, because they were not being used in connection with the premises and hence were not covered by the
personal property clause. The report of the case states that
the conditional bill of sale was made on the 14th day of
March, 1929; the lighting fixtures covered by it were delivered on April 15 and April 17, and that on April 23, the title
company made the final payment under the building loan
mortgage, by which time the conditional sale contract had
not been filed. Since the Court of Appeals in Kommel v.
Herb-Gner Constr. Co.A2 had previously held that an instru-

ment purporting to secure the repayment of advances has
no inception as a mortgage until the advances have been made
by the mortgagee, it would seem to follow that the building
and loan mortgage in the Central Chandelier case 33 apparently entered into before the conditional sale contract was
made, had no legal inception as a mortgage until April 23
which was after the conditional sale contract was entered
into and after the fixtures had been delivered. Thus although
-259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932).
256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E. 413 (1931).
' Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10
(1932).
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prior in point of time to the conditional sale contract, the
building loan mortgage was in legal effect a "subsequent
mortgage" within the meaning of Section 67 of the Personal
Property clause which was applied by the court to the case.
In conclusion the following propositions are submitted:
1. In the case of conditionally sold chattels which do not
remain personalty as a matter of law after annexation, the
prior realty mortgagee is not protected either under Section
67, nor at common law, unless by advancing some of the mortgage money after the annexation of the chattels, he becomes,
in legal effect, a subsequent realty mortgagee to the extent
of those advances.
2. In the case of conditionally sold chattels which remain personalty as a matter of law after annexation, the
prior realty mortgagee is protected only if (a) the realty
mortgage contained a hereafter attached personal property
clause, and then only as to the chattels actually annexed,
and (b) the mortgagee has advanced some of the mortgage
money after such annexation and after the ten-day period
allowed the conditional vendor for filing the contract and
before the conditional vendor thereafter files.
3. In the case of conditionally sold chattels which remain personalty as a matter of law after annexation, the
prior realty mortgagee is not protected by a hereafter attached personal property clause if he had advanced all the
mortgage money before the conditional sale contract was
made, unless he becomes the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
without actual knowledge of the unfiled conditional sale.
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